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ABSTRACT 
CHANGE DETECTION IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND HUMANS 
Deepna Devkar, M.S. 
Supervisory Professor: Anthony Wright, Ph.D. 
  
Visual working memory (VWM) is the temporary retention of visual 
information and a key component of cognitive processing. The classical 
paradigm for studying VWM and its encoding limitations has been change 
detection. Early work focused on how many items could be stored in VWM, 
leading to the popular theory that humans could remember no more than 4±1 
items. More recently, proposals have suggested that VWM is a noisy, continuous 
resource distributed across virtually all items in the visual field, resulting in 
diminished memory quality rather than limited quantity. This debate about the 
nature of VWM has predominantly been studied with humans. Nevertheless, 
nonhuman species could add a great deal to the debate by providing evidence 
related to evolutionary continuity (similarities and/or differences) and model 
systems for investigating the neural basis of VWM. To this end, in the first aim, 
we tested monkeys and humans in virtually identical change detection tasks, 
where the subjects identified which memory item had changed between two 
displays. In addition to the typical manipulation of the number of items to-be-
remembered (2-5 oriented bars), we varied the change magnitude (degree of 
orientation change) – a critical manipulation for discriminating among leading 
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models of VWM encoding limitations. We found that in both species VWM 
performance was best accounted for by a model in which memory items are 
encoded in a noisy manner, where quality of memory is variable and on average 
decreases with increasing set size.  
 The second aim focused on the decision-making component of change 
detection, where observers use noisy sensory information to make a judgment 
about where the change occurred. We tested monkeys and humans in the same 
change detection task (Aim 1), but with ellipses that varied in their height-to-width 
ratio so that their reliability of communicating orientation discrimination could be 
manipulated. The high-reliability ellipses were long and narrow, and the low-
reliability ellipses were short and wide. We compared models that differed with 
respect to how the observers incorporate knowledge of stimulus reliability during 
decision-making. We found that in both species performance was best accounted 
for by a Bayesian model in which observers take into account the uncertainty of 
sensory observations when making perceptual judgments, giving more weight to 
more reliable evidence.  
The comparative results across these related primate species are 
suggestive of evolutionary continuity of basic VWM processing in primates 
generally. These findings provide a strong theoretical foundation for how VWM 
processes work and establish rhesus monkeys as a good animal model system 
for physiological investigations to elucidate the neural substrates of VWM 
processing.  
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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In a brief instant, our visual system can be inundated with an 
overwhelming amount of information. The ability to store and process critical 
information efficiently from our rich, dynamic, and highly complex visual world is 
important to the survival of a species. Visual working memory (VWM) is the 
short-term retention and manipulation of visual information over a few seconds 
(Baddeley, 1992). It is a temporary buffer that allows the brain to compare 
information from the immediate past to the present and integrate changes in a 
visual scene (Phillips, 1974; Rensink, 2002).   
A simple example of the importance of VWM in our everyday lives is when 
a car driver needs to make a quick decision about changing lanes:  he/she must 
be able to detect changes in a traffic situation after looking in all directions (rear 
view mirror, side mirrors, front view of the road, etc.) and remember that 
information sufficiently so that it can be integrated to make safe and optimal 
decisions. Similarly, non-human animals constantly use VWM to detect changes 
in their visual scene to effectively navigate, forage, interact with conspecifics, and 
avoid predators.  
Apart from its role in detecting changes in the visual scene, VWM also 
underpins the execution of many basic cognitive processes such as smooth 
visual perception across saccadic eye movements, target search, guidance of 
goal-directed reaching movements, and filtering of relevant information (Brouwer 
& Knill, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995; Henderson, 2008; Irwin, 1991; Miller, 
Erickson, & Desimone, 1996; Rainer, Asaad, & Miller, 1998). Additionally, VWM 
is interlinked with visual attention, frontal executive control centers, and long-term 
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visual memory (Awh, Vogel, & Oh, 2006; Chun, 2011; Cowan, 2011; Fukuda & 
Vogel, 2011).  Because vision is the dominant sense of many animals, including 
primates, VWM is thus fundamental to the cognition of such species.  
In humans, performance on VWM tasks has been correlated with 
measures of higher cognitive abilities such as problem solving, learning, 
language comprehension, selective/executive attention, and general intelligence 
(Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005; Kiyonaga & 
Egner, 2014). Given its importance in everyday cognitive functioning, it is not 
surprising that deficits in VWM have been associated with several cognitive and 
neuropsychiatric disorders such as spatial neglect, parietal and temporal lobe 
damage, Schizophrenia, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Autism, 
Alzheimer’s disease, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and Depression (Alescio-
Lautier et al., 2007; Berryhill & Olson, 2008; Christopher & MacDonald, 2005; 
Ezzyat & Olson, 2008; Farmer et al., 2000; Gold, Wilk, McMahon, Buchanan, & 
Luck, 2003; Kim, Liu, Glizer, Tannock, & Woltering, 2014; Pellicano, Gibson, 
Maybery, Durkin, & Badcock, 2005; Pisella, Berberovic, & Mattingley, 2004; 
Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker, 1998). Despite decades of work relating 
VWM to psychiatric diseases and cognition generally, answers to many basic 
processes of VWM remain elusive. With so much left to be understood about the 
impairments associated with failures of VWM, a better understanding of the 
normal functioning of VWM mechanisms might provide a better foundation for 
treating these impairments and evaluating the efficacy of treatment. 
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Behavioral research aimed at understanding VWM has used delayed 
matching-to-sample, memory span, or N-back tasks which in many cases require 
remembering only a single memorandum at a given instant (Fuster & Alexander, 
1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Miller et al., 1996). Although these approaches 
have been  influential in understanding some time limitations of VWM by testing 
only single-item VWM, they are not particularly relevant to natural visual scenes, 
where  multiple items must be processed and integrated in a continuously 
changing stream of information (Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; 
Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; E. K. Miller et al., 1996). The 
basic processes by which multiple items are encoded and processed in visual 
working memory needs to be better understood for assessing many of the 
underlying processes, neural circuitry, and failures of VWM.  
Over the past few decades, the leading task for investigating multiple-item 
VWM and the amount of information that can be maintained simultaneously in 
VWM has been change detection (Rensink, 2002). In a typical change detection 
task, an observer is presented with a sample array of two or more stimuli, which 
is followed by a brief delay (usually more than 80 ms to exceed the duration of 
attentional capture). The number of stimuli in the sample array (or the items that 
are to-be-remembered) will be referred to as set size. After the delay, a test array 
is presented with a changed item and the observer’s task is to identify whether or 
where the change occurred between the two arrays.  
Results from such human change detection studies have shown 
proportion correct to be very high for small set sizes (e.g., 2 - 4 items), but 
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becomes progressively less accurate with increasing set sizes beyond 3 to 4 
items (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). 
These results have led to the popular theory that VWM is capacity limited, where 
only a fixed number of items can be held in memory. This fixed-capacity theory 
was first suggested by George Miller; however at the time, the ‘magical’ number 
was thought to be 7± 2 items (Miller, 1956). The capacity was then estimated to 
be higher than it is now because of the human ability to “chunk” bits of 
information together to maximize capacity. This number has since been replaced 
with 4 ± 1 items (Cowan, 2001). This fixed-capacity theory has also been called 
the item-limit or slot theory because only a limited number of items are proposed 
to be stored in discrete “slots”. According to this theory, items are encoded in 
memory in an all-or-none fashion such that remembered items are stored with 
high fidelity, and no information is retained about other items. This theory of a 
fixed capacity has dominated much of the thinking about  working memory for 
about half-a-century and has formed the basis of many neural investigations of 
human VWM (Edward Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007; Luck & Vogel, 2013; Rouder 
et al., 2008; Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004; Xu & Chun, 2006).  
In the last decade, the item-limit model has been challenged in the human 
literature on several grounds. First of all, even though it has been argued that the 
capacity estimate is stable across several short-term memory modalities 
(including visual, verbal, and auditory) and across testing paradigms (Cowan, 
2001, 2005), some studies have reported that this so-called ‘magical number’ 
actually does vary when information load and  stimulus complexity are 
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manipulated (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Eng, Chen, & Jiang, 2005; Olson & 
Jiang, 2002). Second, the fixed-capacity theory proposes an absolute view of all-
or-none storage that is highly questionable based on grounds of signal detection 
theory. Signal detection theory has dominated psychophysics for the past half 
century, showing that sensory observations are subject to noise, and detection 
performance is imperfect due to errors in separating the true signal from noise 
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Third, the notion that a 
stimulus can be encoded perfectly is at odds with the evidence that  neural 
systems are inherently noisy (e.g., Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008).  
An alternative theory that reconciles most of the problems associated with 
all-or-none fixed capacity is that memory is a continuous resource that can be 
allocated to many (if not all items) in the field of view (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014). 
At the inception of these resource models, Wilken & Ma (2004) proposed that 
stimuli are encoded in memory in a noisy fashion, with the level of noise per item 
increasing with set size. Memory precision (which is inversely related to noise) 
decreases with the number of objects in the visual scene. Thus, according to the 
resource view, performance decreases because of a reduction in the quality of 
memories, rather than a cap or limit on the number of items that can be stored 
(Bays & Husain, 2008; Bays, Catalao, & Husain, 2009; Keshvari, van den Berg, 
& Ma, 2013; van den Berg, Shin, Chou, George, & Ma, 2012; Wilken & Ma, 
2004). Nevertheless, in an attempt to salvage the item-limit theory, variants on 
the item-limit theory have been proposed, including combining fixed capacity with 
resource (e.g., Zhang & Luck, 2008). Recent work in humans has attempted to 
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distinguish among the item-limit model, its more recent variants, and resource 
models (Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg, Awh, & Ma, 2014; van den Berg, 
Shin, et al., 2012; van den Berg & Ma, 2014).  
Compared to this rich body of ongoing work in humans, very little is known 
about how visual information is encoded in non-human animals and whether their 
VWM system suffers from the same limitations as humans. Rhesus monkeys are 
an ideal species for such investigations because they have similar visual memory 
processing mechanisms as humans (Wright, 2007; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; 
Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Sands & Wright, 1980). Results from such studies might 
help to disambiguate some of the controversies surrounding visual memory 
processing mechanisms in primates generally. For example, if rhesus monkeys 
(or some other animal species) were to show qualitative similarity to humans in 
underlying mechanisms of VWM then this nonhuman animal could be used as a 
model system for invasive investigations of VWM such as electrophysiological 
recordings, lesions, genetic, and pharmacological manipulations.  
Several  recent studies have begun to investigate these questions in, 
rhesus monkeys, but the results and findings have been mixed (Buschman, 
Siegel, Roy, & Miller, 2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar, Johnston, & Paré, 
2011; Lara & Wallis, 2012).. For example, Elmore et al. (2011) noted that 
memory sensitivity (discriminability, d’, used as a measure of precision) 
decreases as the number of memory items increases. Moreover, this decline in 
performance is well fit by a power law function. Similarly, Lara and Wallis (2012) 
reported that precision of memory representations, and subsequently, 
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performance accuracy decreases with increasing set size. These findings are 
consistent with the theory of a continuous-resource model, where memory 
resource can be flexibly allocated to multiple items. Buschman and colleagues 
simultaneously recorded from area V4 and prefrontal cortex in the rhesus 
macaque while the animal was performing a change localization task at varying 
set sizes. They found that at the neural level, information is distributed among 
multiple items in the visual scene in a graded fashion. However, this sharing of 
resource only occurred when items were displayed in the same visual hemifield. 
They concluded that the two hemifields seemed to have discrete, slot-like 
resources with independent capacities. To interpret neural data from such an 
experiment, it is essential to connect them to critical measures describing the 
animal’s behavioral performance. However, which behavioral parameters are 
most relevant depends on which model describes behavior best. For example, if 
a resource model were to fit the behavioral results  better than a fixed-capacity 
model, then the common practice of finding neural correlates of the item capacity 
would make little sense, and instead would point to a resource description of 
neural activity. Thus, it is essential to first determine which model best accounts 
for non-human primate behavior in order to specify the framework for neural 
investigations of the basis of VWM. 
Unfortunately, psychophysical studies with monkeys are sparse and none 
have performed detailed model comparisons such as those in the human 
literature (Keshvari, van den Berg, & Ma, 2012; Keshvari et al., 2013; van den 
Berg, Shin, et al., 2012; but see Lara & Wallis, 2012 for limited model 
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comparisons). Ma and colleagues have suggested that in order to distinguish 
among models of VWM, it is important to measure change detection performance 
across a wide range of change magnitudes, in addition to the typical 
manipulation of set size. This approach has been used effectively with humans to 
distinguish among leading models of VWM in detailed model comparisons 
(Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). However, change 
detection studies with monkeys have typically used displays containing highly 
discriminable stimuli such as clip art images of everyday objects or colored 
shapes (Buschman et al., 2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Lara 
& Wallis, 2012). Differences among such highly discriminable stimuli are difficult 
to measure (but see Elmore et al, 2011 for multidimensional scaling of stimuli).  
Nevertheless, measuring discriminability of such stimuli would not in itself provide 
a basis for distinguishing among current models of VWM.  To make such 
distinctions, the degree of change discrimination needs to be parametrically 
varied to produce psychometric functions, where accuracy gradually rises from 
near chance performance (50% correct in many cases) to near maximum 
accuracy for very large change discriminations.  To this end, in the first set of 
experiments to be presented, we used oriented line bars and systematically 
varied change magnitude along with set size. By using these manipulations and 
the psychometric functions generated by them, our purpose was to rigorously 
compare five leading models of VWM encoding in parallel with monkeys and 
humans in an identical change detection paradigm. The theory and 
10 
 
computational details of each of these models are described in detail in Chapter 
2.  
VWM processing consists of two components: an encoding stage, where 
internal representations of the observed stimulus are generated, and a decision-
making stage, during which information from these noisy measurements is used 
to make a decision. Change detection tasks are designed to test both the 
encoding and decision components of VWM. The observer encodes information 
about the sample stimuli, compares the maintained memory of the sample stimuli 
with the test stimuli at the corresponding locations, makes a judgment about 
which test stimulus has changed, and then makes a response based on this 
decision. Memory of the stimuli are seldom perfectly precise, therefore this less-
than-perfect precision translates (proportionately) to noisy internal 
representations of stimuli. This internal noise varies across stimuli and trials. For 
example, even when the same stimulus is presented repeatedly, the sensory 
responses that it evokes in the form of neural activity can vary largely from trial-
to-trial (Faisal et al., 2008; Tolhurst, Movshon, & Dean, 1983). Thus, an observer 
has to make a judgment about sensory observations in the presence of 
uncertainty caused by both internal and external factors. In making such 
judgments, knowing the nature of memory precision would benefit the observer in 
making better decisions.  
Signal detection theory suggests that observers use Bayesian inference to 
make decisions that will maximize his/her decision performance on a trial, given 
the noisy stimulus encoding. In the change detection task, for example, a 
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Bayesian observer uses this noisy information to compute a probability 
distribution of whether or where the change occurred. Based on this computation, 
the observer chooses the location with the highest probability of change. In 
recent decades, studies have shown that in many perceptual tasks, humans are 
Bayesian observers and take into account the uncertainty associated with the 
noisy encoding of stimuli (Knill & Pouget, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996). This 
uncertainty about the stimulus and precision itself can vary from trial-to-trial. 
Thus, in order to optimize performance, the observer must interpret uncertain 
sensory information by taking into account memory precision on a trial-by-trial 
basis. This process is referred to as “probabilistic computation’’ (Ma, 2012).  
Psychophysical evidence for these types of probabilistic computations 
have been reported across several paradigms, including change detection, cue 
combination, multisensory integration, object perception, and sensorimotor 
learning (Angelaki, Gu, & DeAngelis, 2009; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Kersten, 
Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Keshvari et al., 2012; Knill & Richards, 1996; Körding 
& Wolpert, 2004).  In these paradigms, the encoding precision not only varies 
from trial to trial for the same stimulus but also varies across different stimuli and 
possibly other factors as well (e.g., location). The purpose of explicitly 
manipulating the nature of the stimuli themselves (in addition to their orientation) 
is to vary the reliability of the stimulus, such as the height-to-width aspect ratio of 
an ellipse or the contrast ratio of the stimuli. For example, shorter, wider ellipses 
would provide less reliable information about orientation and consequently less 
information about orientation changes than longer, narrower ellipses.  A 
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Bayesian observer would give more weight to measurements with higher 
reliability and thus higher certainty. It is important to note that Bayesian inference 
does not always translate to optimal inference (Ma, 2012). Bayesian inference is 
based on a subjective computation over sensory observations, which are prone 
to incorrect assumptions. When an observer’s Bayesian estimation is based on 
incorrect assumptions, he/she can be suboptimal. The question, then, is the 
degree to which observers optimally evaluate the reliability of the stimulus in 
making a task-relevant decision.  
Aim 2 of my thesis focuses on the decision-making component of VWM in 
a task related to that of Aim 1. I tested monkeys and humans in the same 
decision task and compared three Bayesian models of decision-making that vary 
with respect to the assumption that the observer makes about memory precision, 
based on their evaluation of stimulus uncertainty. The theoretical explanations of 
these models and their mathematical derivations are described in Chapter 4.  
Qualitative similarities in monkeys and humans for encoding (Aim 1) and 
decision-making (Aim 2) would suggest evolutionary continuity and provide a 
model system for exploring the neurobiology and neural circuitry of VWM.  
Differences could also be important. For example, monkeys might be similar to 
humans in stimulus processing (encoding) but different from humans in decision 
optimality.  Such results might suggest a judgment difference despite processing 
similarity, and perhaps lead to a better understanding of how these fundamental 
cognitive processes are employed and how they might be improved. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, VWM processing consists of two 
stages: an encoding stage, where internal representations of visually presented 
stimuli are generated in memory, and a decision stage, where the internal 
representations are used to make a decision. We conducted two experiments of 
change detection that were designed to tap into both of these stages of 
processing. In Aim 1, we tested leading models of VWM encoding. In this task, 
observers briefly viewed a sample array of N randomly oriented bars (henceforth 
called items) and, following a delay, a test array containing two randomly chosen 
items from the sample array, of which one had a different orientation than in the 
sample array. The magnitude of the associated orientation change could take 
one of nine values. Observers reported which item had changed orientation. In 
this chapter I describe how we mathematically formalized and tested the 
encoding and decision stages.  
Encoding 
We tested five leading models of encoding, which differ in the way that 
they conceptualize the precise nature of memory resource and how it is allocated 
across multiple items in the visual scene. The five models are: item-limit, equal 
precision, equal precision with a fixed capacity, variable precision, and variable 
precision with a fixed capacity. The theory and modeling of each of these models 
are described below. N here represents set size, or the number of items in the 
sample array and K represents capacity.  
Item-limit (infinite-precision) model 
15 
 
In the item-limit model, observers cannot store more than K items. When 
N≤K, all items are stored. The probability of being correct is then 1−ε, where ε 
accounts for lapses of attention and unintended responses. When N>K, K 
randomly selected items from the sample display are stored. When the test 
display appears, there are then four scenarios to consider: 
• Both test items were stored. This happens with probability . The 
probability of being correct is then 1−ε. 
• One test item was stored, the other was not. This happens with probability 
. The probability of being correct is then 1−ε. 
• Neither test item was stored. This happens with probability 
The observer then has to guess about which item 
changed, and probability correct is 0.5. 
Overall proportion correct is then 
 
 
( )
( )
1
1
K K
N N
−
−
( )
( )
2
1
K N K
N N
−
−
( )( )
( )
1
1
N K N K
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− − −
−
( ) ( )
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( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
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− − −
− − −
= − − −
−
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Note that storing all N items (K=N) yields the same proportion correct, 
namely 1−ε, as storing only N−1 items, since even if one test item was not stored, 
the trial can be answered correctly by using the other test item. As can be seen 
from the equation, in the item-limit model, proportion correct depends on set size 
but not on change magnitude. 
Noise-based (finite-precision) models 
We assume that both orientations in the test display, which we denote by 
φ1 and φ2, are known noiselessly to the observer, because they remain on the 
screen until the subject responds. We model the memories of the orientations in 
the sample display as noisy. Noise can stem from encoding (presentation time 
was limited) or maintenance of memories; we do not distinguish between these 
possibilities. We model the noisy memory of the ith item in the sample display, 
denoted xi (i=1,..,N), as following a Von Mises distribution (circular Gaussian 
distribution because our stimuli exist in circular space) centered at the true 
stimulus, θi, with concentration parameter κi: 
  (1) 
where I0 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 0. We have 
postulated previously that the role of precision is played by the Fisher information 
in this memory representation, denoted Ji  (Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg, 
Shin, et al., 2012). This quantity is related to the concentration parameter through 
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 , 
where I1 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 1. The 
relationship between precision and concentration parameter is nearly the identity 
and none of our results would qualitatively change if one were to replace Ji by κi. 
In the equal-precision (EP) model, the precision of each item is inversely related 
to set size through a power law: 
 . 
where JN=1 is the precision of a single item. The precision of all items in a display 
is equal. 
In the equal precision with fixed capacity (EPF) model (also known as slots-plus-
resources), no more than K items can be stored. Thus, the number of stored 
items is min(N,K). The precision of a stored item is inversely related to the 
number of stored items through a power law, 
 . 
The precision associated with a non-stored item is zero. When N≤K, the EPF 
model is equal to the EP model.  
In the variable-precision (VP) model, precision exhibits fluctuations across both 
space and time. The precision of each item is drawn independently from a 
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gamma distribution with mean  and scale parameter τ. This mean is inversely 
related to set size through a power law: 
 , 
where  is the mean precision of a single item.  
The variable precision with fixed capacity (VPF) model is equal to the VP model 
when N≤K. The precision of a stored item is drawn independently from a gamma 
distribution with mean  and scale parameter τ. This mean is inversely related to 
the number of stored items through a power law: 
  
where  is the mean precision of a single item. The precision associated with 
a non-stored item is zero.  
The models have 2, 2, 3, 3, and 4 free parameters, respectively. 
Decision-making  
So far, we have described the encoding stage: how stimuli give rise to 
noisy memories. What is also needed in each of the noise-based models is a 
description of how the observer makes the two-alternative localization decision 
based on the noisy memories and the test display. We use an ideal (Bayesian-
optimal) observer to describe this process. Bayesian-optimal inference refers to 
J
1NJJ
Nα
==
1NJ =
J
( )
1
min ,
NJJ
N K α
==
1NJ =
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the decision strategy that maximizes the observer’s accuracy on a given trial 
based on the noisy measurements (Knill & Richards, 1996). The resulting 
decision rule is similar to the ideal-observer models of related N-alternative 
change localization and change detection tasks (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van 
den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012), but differs in the details. 
Step 1: Generative model 
We begin by describing the decision process for the EP and VP models. 
The diagram shows the relevant variables: the location of the change, L (1 or 2), 
the magnitude of the change, Δ, the relevant sample orientations, θ1 and θ2 (all 
other sample items are irrelevant to the decision), their noisy memories, x1, and 
x2, and the two test orientations, φ1 and φ2. 
 
 
Each variable has an associated probability distribution. Since both test locations 
are equally likely to contain the change, we have p(L)=0.5. Change magnitude Δ 
and each of the sample orientations have discrete distributions, but we 
L
θ1, θ2 φ1, φ2
x1, x2
Δ
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approximate them by uniform distributions, , and  . 
The noisy memories x1 and x2 are distributed according to
, where p(xi|θi) is given by Eq. (1). Finally, the 
test orientations are , where 1L is equal to (1,0) when L=1 
and (0,1) when L=2. 
Step 2: Inference 
The observer infers L based on the noisy memories x1 and x2 and the test 
orientations φ1 and φ2. An ideal observer does this by computing the posterior 
distribution over L, p(L|x1,x2,φ1,φ2). Since L is binary, all information about the 
posterior is contained in the log posterior ratio, which can be rewritten using 
Bayes’ rule: 
 
since p(L=1)=p(L=2). We evaluate the likelihood of L=1: 
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Similarly, the likelihood of L=2 is: 
. 
Combining, we find for the log posterior ratio 
 
The ideal observer responds that the change occurred at location 1 when 
the log posterior ratio is positive: 
 (2) 
This decision rule is valid for both the VP and EP models. In the VP 
model, precision per item is a random variable, and therefore κ1 and κ2 will 
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generally not be equal to each other. However, in the case of the EP model, we 
have κ1=κ2 and the inequality simplifies to  
. (3) 
This rule is intuitive: the observer reports that the change occurred at 
location 1 when the angular distance between the noisy memory at location 2 
and the test orientation at location 2 is smaller than the corresponding distance at 
location 1. Then, there is more evidence that the change occurred at location 1. 
One can think of Eq. (2) as a precision-weighted version of Eq. (3). 
The EPF model is very similar to the EP model, but with one difference 
when N>K. Then, a noisy measurement has a probability of not being stored. 
This is equivalent to setting the concentration parameter of the corresponding 
memory to 0. Thus, we can immediately obtain the decision rule from the EPF 
model by taking special cases of Eq. (2): 
 (4) 
 The VPF model is identical to the VP model when N≤K. When N>K, just 
as in the EPF model above, a noisy measurement has a probability of not being 
stored (precision = 0). But, unlike the EPF model, the concentration parameters, 
 and in the VPF model are drawn independently. With these modifications, 
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we can again take the special cases of Eq. (2) and obtain the decision rules for 
the VPF model: 
                   
(5) 
The second and third inequality in the EPF and VPF models may seem 
counterintuitive, since they only involve one memory. However, they make 
sense: even when the observer only has the memory corresponding to one of the 
test items, the discrepancy between the memory and the test is still informative 
about whether or not the change occurred in that one item. 
Expected behavior 
If we had access to the observer’s noisy memories x1 and x2 on each trial, 
the model would predict their response exactly. Since we don’t, the best we can 
do is to compute the probability of being correct for a given stimulus condition. 
Under the assumptions in our generative model, the stimulus condition is 
determined completely by set size N and change magnitude Δ, and the values of 
θ1 and θ2 are irrelevant. Thus, we are interested in the probability that the 
decision rule (Eq. (2) for VP, Eq. (3) for EP, Eq. (4) for EPF, and Eq. (5) for VPF) 
returns the correct location, when the memories x1 and x2 follow their respective 
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distributions given N and Δ. Without loss of generality, we compute proportion 
correct by taking θ1=θ2=0, and L=1, so that φ1=0 and φ2=Δ.  
For the EP model then,
  
where VM(µ,κ) denotes the Von Mises distribution with mean µ and 
concentration parameter κ.  
For the EPF model, proportion correct is computed as a sum across the four 
possibilities for which items were stored (see Eq. (4)): 
 
For the VP model, 
 
 
For the VPF model, proportion correct is computed as a sum across the four 
possibilities for which items were stored (see Eq. (5)): 
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Each of these proportions correct was determined through Monte Carlo 
simulation, i.e. through a large number (10,000) of random draws of x1 and x2 
(and of J1 and J2 as well in the case of the VP and VPF models). For each draw, 
we evaluated the decision rule, and then computed across all draws the 
proportion of correct responses.  
Finally, for each model, we discretized parameter space finely and 
calculated a look-up table in which each entry gave the predicted probability of a 
correct response at one (N,Δ) combination for one parameter combination. Once 
we derived proportion correct for each model, the next step was to fit the models 
to the subjects’ data. The specific methods for this step are described in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3: CHANGE DETECTION TESTING IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND 
HUMANS: ENCODING 
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Introduction 
 
As described in Chapter 2, we tested the five leading models of VWM 
encoding n parallel with monkeys and humans: 1) item-limit 2) equal-precision 3) 
equal-precision+fixed capacity 4) variable-precision and 5) variable-
precision+fixed capacity (Figure 3.1).  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic representation of resource allocation in five leading models 
of VWM. Each box represents an item to-be-remembered and the height of the 
fill represents the amount of resource allocated to that item. Set size is 2 (left) or 
5 (right), with a hypothetical capacity limit of 3 for the Item-Limit, Equal-Precision 
+ Fixed Capacity, and Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity models.  
  
N=2 N=5
Equal-Precision
Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity
Variable-Precision
Item-Limit
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity
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According to the item-limit (IL) model, a fixed number of items (the 
capacity) are kept in memory with infinite precision, while remaining items are 
absent from memory (Cowan, 2001; S J Luck & Vogel, 1997; Pashler, 1988). The 
equal-precision (EP) model postulates that all items are remembered with equal 
memory precision, but the precision per item decreases with increasing set size 
(Palmer, 1990; Shaw, 1980). Decreasing precision is associated with increasing 
noise; that is, at a larger set size, each item is remembered in a noisier fashion 
(with lower precision). The equal-precision + fixed capacity (EPF) model 
combines elements of the item-limit and equal-precision models such that only a 
fixed number of items can be remembered, but each item in memory has finite 
precision (Zhang & Luck, 2008). When set size is smaller than the capacity, the 
model allows for precision to depend on set size. The variable-precision (VP) 
model is like the equal-precision model in that all items are remembered with 
finite precision but, by contrast, precision can vary from item to item and trial to 
trial (Fougnie, Suchow, & Alvarez, 2012; Keshvari et al., 2013; van den Berg, 
Shin, et al., 2012). The variable-precision + fixed capacity (VPF) model combines 
elements of the item-limit and variable-precision models such that only a fixed 
number of items can be remembered, but precision varies across items (van den 
Berg et al., 2014). All four finite-precision models (EP, VP, and to a lesser extent, 
EPF and VPF) attribute change-detection errors to the difficulty of separating the 
signal from noise. For these four models, we used Bayesian inference to model 
the decision stage; on each trial, the observer reports the location that has the 
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highest probability of containing the changed item (see Chapter 2. The IL, EP, 
EPF, VP, and VPF models have 2, 2, 3, 3 and 4 free parameters, respectively.  
Three rhesus monkeys were tested for 11,520 trials each and ten humans 
were tested for 1152 trials each on the same visual change detection task 
(Figure 3.2). Subjects viewed a brief sample array of 2, 3, 4, or 5 randomly 
oriented bars (henceforth called items) and, following a delay, a test array 
containing two randomly chosen items from the sample array, of which one had a 
different orientation than in the sample array. The magnitude of the associated 
orientation change could take one of nine values. Subjects identified which item 
had changed orientation by touching it, and received trial-to-trial feedback. 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3.2 Trial Procedure. Subjects (monkeys and humans) were asked to 
report which item changed in its orientation between sample and test displays.  
Delay
Fixation
Sample 
Test 
300 ms
1000 ms
touch to
respond
touch to 
initiate
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Methods 
Monkeys 
Subjects 
Three adult male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; weights: M1 = 16.5 
kg, M2 = 14.5 kg, M3 = 13.51 kg; ages: M1 = 17.5, M2 = 16.5, and M3 = 12.5 
years) were tested in a change detection experiment for five days each week. 
Food and water were regulated prior to experimental sessions. After completing 
daily testing, animals were returned to their caging room, where they were 
housed individually and received primate chow and water to maintain their 
normal body weight. On days that the monkeys were not tested, they were given 
supplemental fruits and vegetables for enrichment in addition to the daily diet. All 
animal procedures were performed in accordance with the National Institutes of 
Health guidelines, approved by the Institutional Review Board at University of 
Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and supervised by the Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee.  
Apparatus 
During experimental sessions, the monkeys were placed unrestrained in a 
custom-made aluminum experimental chamber (47.5 cm wide x 53.1 cm deep x 
66.3 cm high). An infrared touchscreen detected touch responses to a 17" 
computer monitor. The touch responses were guided using a Plexiglas template 
with 6 cutouts (diameter of each circle cutout = 2.75 cm) that were arranged on 
an imaginary circle of 9.0 cm diameter, matching the six possible locations of the 
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stimuli, and a cutout in the center (diameter = 2.5 cm) for touches to a fixation 
point. Using a computer-controlled relay interface (Model P10-12; Metrabyte, 
Taunton, MA), correct responses were rewarded with either a banana pellet or 
cherry Koolaid. The relay interface controlled the illumination of the chamber 
using a 25 W green light bulb located outside of the chamber. The offset of the 
green light illuminating the chamber through a small gap between the 
touchscreen and the monitor marked the start of the next trial. Throughout 
testing, the monkeys were monitored with a video camera outside the chamber 
and focused through a small glass covered port on the right side of the chamber. 
Experimental sessions were designed, operated, and recorded using a custom 
program written in Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 1.8 cm x 0.4 cm white bars displayed on a black 
background. Based on the average distance of the monkey from the screen 
(approximately 35 cm), the stimuli subtended a visual angle of 2.9° x 0.65°. 
Stimuli were presented in six possible locations on the screen, arranged on an 
imaginary circle (see Apparatus).  
Trial procedure 
Each trial began with a red fixation point in the center of the screen as 
shown in Figure 2.1. The monkeys had to make a one-touch response to the 
fixation point, which initiated the presentation of a sample display. This display 
contained two or more items (see below), and had a duration that differed 
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between monkeys and between training and testing (see below). After a delay of 
1000 ms, the test display was presented, which always consisted of two items, 
placed at the same locations as two items from the sample display. One test item 
had the same orientation as the corresponding item in the sample display, and 
the other test item had a different orientation. The monkeys’ task was to identify 
which item had changed, and to touch that item. The test display remained on 
the screen until response. Correct responses were rewarded. An intertrial interval 
of 3000 ms followed the choice response, during which a green light illuminated 
the chamber and the screen was dark. 
Training  
Two of the monkeys that participated in this study (M2 and M3) had been 
previously trained in a change detection task using clip art images and colored 
squares (Elmore et al., 2011). For these two monkeys, we intermixed trials of 
oriented bars (new stimuli) with trials of colored squares for initial task 
acquisition. Once the monkeys’ performance on these orientation trials was 
similar to their baseline color trial performance, we began training them with only 
orientation trials. Since M1 had not been previously trained on this task, we 
directly trained him with oriented bars. All three monkeys were first trained at set 
sizes 2 and 3, change magnitudes of 22.5°, 45°, 67.5°, and 90°, and a sample 
viewing time of 1000 ms. Once overall accuracy reached approximately 70%, set 
sizes 4 and 5 and finer change magnitudes (10° to 90° in 10° increments) were 
gradually introduced. Finally, we gradually reduced sample viewing times while 
maintaining approximately 70% accuracy on set size 2 trials. For M1 and M3, this 
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led to a viewing time of 300 ms, and for M2 to a viewing time of 600 ms. Total 
training lasted approximately 8 months.  
Testing 
The sample display was shown for 300 ms for M1 and M3, and 600 ms for 
M2. Set size was 2, 3, 4, or 5. Set sizes were pseudorandomized within each 
192-trial block (48 trials per set size). The orientation of each sample item, θ, was 
drawn independently from a uniform distribution over 18 possible orientations (−
90°, −80°,…, −10°, 10°, 20°,…, 80°). The orientation of the changed item in the 
test display was drawn from the same distribution, except for orientation of the 
other sample items on this trial, so that the changed orientation would not be 
confused with other stimuli that did not change. Testing consisted of 60 sessions, 
with 192-trial blocks per session, for a total of 11,520 trials per monkey.  
Humans 
Subjects 
Ten human subjects (8 females) aged 21-33 years (mean age = 27.1 
years) participated. Each subject visited the lab for two 1.5-hour sessions and 
was compensated $10 per session. Study procedures were approved by the 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institutional Review 
Board.   
Apparatus and stimuli  
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Subjects were seated in a chair in a small room equipped with a computer. 
At the beginning of the experiment, the distance between the chair and the 
screen was adjusted so that the stimuli and display would subtend approximately 
the same visual angles as for the monkeys. Subjects were asked to maintain 
approximately the same distance. The monitor and touchscreen were identical to 
those used for monkeys. Two 25 W light bulbs were mounted on the wall behind 
the subjects to provide feedback. Stimuli were identical to those used for 
monkeys.  
Trial Procedure 
The trial procedure was identical to that for the monkeys, except for the 
feedback. Feedback consisted of a green room light (75 W) that  illuminated the 
testing room for 1 s and was accompanied by a tone following correct responses, 
or a red light that illuminated testing room for 1 s following incorrect responses.  
Training and Testing 
Each subject completed two testing sessions, each consisting of three 
192-trial blocks, for a total of 1152 trials per subject. Subjects were given a 10-
minute break time in between blocks. Each subject completed 8 practice trials at 
the beginning of the first session.  
Model fitting 
Denoting all parameters of a model by a vector t, the log likelihood of t (the 
parameter log likelihood) is 
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where the product is over trials (from 1 to ntrials) and correctnessi is 1 if the 
subject was correct on the ith trial and 0 if not. We can rewrite this as 
, (1) 
where trials are grouped by set size N, change magnitude Δ, and by whether the 
observer was correct or incorrect, and n (N,Δ,correct) is the number of trials with 
a particular N, Δ, and correctness. 
For each subject data set, we used Eq. (1) and the precomputed look-up table of 
model predictions mentioned above to find the log likelihood of each parameter 
combination. The parameter combination on this grid that maximized the log 
likelihood gives the estimates of the parameters. The model predictions 
corresponding to that parameter combination were then used to compute the 
model fits to the psychometric curves. 
Model comparison 
To compare models, we used four metrics: the Akaike Information Criterion 
(Akaike, 1974), the Akaike Information Corrected Criterion (Burnham, 2002; 
Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978), and 
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the log marginal likelihood (MacKay, 2003). All four measures penalize models 
for having more free parameters, but the penalties differ.  
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
AIC rewards a model’s good fit but penalizes free parameters. It is defined as 
, 
where  is the maximum of the parameter log likelihood LL(t) and is the 
number of free parameters in the model. In this thesis, the following multiple of 
AIC are reported:  
, 
so that the leading term is the maximum log likelihood. 
Akaike Information Corrected Criterion (AICc) 
AICc is a corrected version of AIC, designed for data sets with few trials:  
, 
where ntrials denotes the number of trials. We report a modified AICc value, 
defined as 
. 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
maxAIC 2 2LL k= − +
maxLL k
*
max
1AIC AIC
2
LL k≡ − = −
k k
n k
+
= +
− −trials
2 ( 1)AICc AIC
1
*
max
trials
1 ( 1)AICc AICc
2 1
k kLL k
n k
+
≡ − = − −
− −
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BIC is similar to AIC in that it is also based on the maximum likelihood, but it has 
a larger penalty term for the number of free parameters.  
. 
We report the modified BIC, 
. 
Log Marginal Likelihood (LML) 
Bayesian model comparison consists of calculating the log likelihood of a model 
m given the data, LL(model) = log p(data|model). Unlike the previous metrics, 
this is not solely based on the maximum likelihood. Instead, it involves integrating 
over the parameters; this is also called marginalizing over the parameters, which 
is why LL(model) is also called the log marginal likelihood: 
  
For the parameter prior p(t|model), we chose a discrete uniform distribution on 
the same grid as used for parameter estimation. We denote the size of the range 
of the jth parameter by Rj, and its grid spacing by δtj. Numerical values are 
specified in Table S1. We also rewrite slightly so as to avoid highly negative 
numbers in the exponent (those cause numerical underflow). Then we find 
max trialsBIC 2 logLL k n= − +
*
max trials
1BIC BIC log
2 2
kLL n≡ − = −
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
model log data |model
log data |model, |model
log |modelLL
LL p
p p d
e p d
=
=
=
∫
∫
t
t t t
t t
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 . 
The difference of the log marginal likelihood between two models is also called 
the log Bayes factor of those two models. 
Bootstrapping 
Since we had only three monkey subjects, we used bootstrapping (Efron, 1993) 
for each monkey separately to estimate the standard errors on all summary 
statistics. The original data set for each monkey consisted of 11,520 trials. We 
sampled the same number of trials (a combination of set size, change 
magnitude, and correctness) with replacement from this dataset, to create a new 
dataset. We repeated sampling 100 times to create 100 bootstrapped data sets 
for each monkey.   From each individual bootstrapped data set, we estimated the 
parameters, computed psychometric curves, calculated R2, and computed AIC, 
AICc, BIC, and LML, and computed means for each by averaging across all 
bootstrapped data sets from the same monkey, with standard deviations serving 
as estimates of the standard errors of the means.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
For both species, proportion correct decreased monotonically as a 
function of set size, with humans being substantially more accurate than 
monkeys (Figure 3.3).  
( ) ( ) maxmax
1  on grid
model log log
k
LLj
j j
t
LL LL
R
δ −
=
= + +∑ ∑ t
t
LLe
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3.3 Proportion correct as a function of set size for humans and three 
monkeys (M1, M2, and M3).  
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A more detailed representation of the data is provided by proportion 
correct as a function of change magnitude for each of the four set sizes (Figure 
3.4). We found large effects of both set size and change magnitude on VWM 
performance in both species (humans: two-way repeated-measures ANOVA; set 
size: F(3,27) = 64.05, p < 0.001, change magnitude: F(8,72) = 80.36, p <  0.001). 
The dependence on set size replicates findings  found in many prior studies, both 
with humans (Keshvari et al., 2013; S J Luck & Vogel, 1997; van den Berg, Shin, 
et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004) and with monkeys (Buschman et al., 2011; 
Elmore et al., 2011; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Lara & Wallis, 2012). While most 
studies have ignored the variable of change magnitude, a few recent studies 
have systematically measured the effect of change magnitude and found effects 
similar to those shown in Figure 2.4 (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; Lara & Wallis, 
2012; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Here, we exploit the statistical strength 
afforded by the joint dependencies of proportion correct on set size and change 
magnitude to compare models of VWM. 
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 3.4 (A) Proportion correct across set size (N) and change magnitude (º) 
for humans; mean ± s.e.m. across ten subjects (B – D) Same for M1, M2, and 
M3 respectively; mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets.  
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In spite of the large performance differences between both species, it is 
possible that the underlying VWM mechanisms are the same. To test this 
possibility, we compared the five leading models of VWM limitations for each 
individual monkey and human. We used maximum-likelihood estimation to fit the 
parameters in each model for each individual human subject as well as for each 
data set sampled using bootstrapping from an individual monkey’s data. We 
found that models could not be strongly distinguished based on set size only 
(Figures 3.5-3.8).  
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 3.5. Proportion correct as a function of set size for humans. Circles and 
error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-
Precision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: 
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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Figure 6 
 
Figure 3.6. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M1. Circles and error 
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision, 
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: Variable-
Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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Figure 7 
 
Figure3.7. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M2. Circles and error 
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision, 
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: Variable-
Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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Figure 8 
 
Figure 3.8. Proportion correct as a function of set size for M3. Circles and error 
bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits. IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision, 
EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: Variable-
Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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The added manipulation of change magnitude, however, clearly separates 
these model predictions (Figures 3.9-3.12). The data from both species are best 
described by the two variable precision models, one in which there is a fixed 
capacity limit and another without a fixed capacity limit (VPF: R2 values, M1: 
0.902 ± 0.022; M2: 0.887 ± 0.024; M3: 0.896 ± 0.020; Humans: 0.803 ± 0.023; 
VP: M1: 0.90 ± 0.023; M2: 0.885 ± 0.024; M3: 0.891 ± 0.020; Humans: 0.799 ± 
0.023), followed by the equal-precision + fixed-capacity model (R2 values, M1: 
0.755 ± 0.046; M2: 0.854 ± 0.030; M3: 0.817 ± 0.035; Humans: 0.714 ± 0.043), 
the equal-precision model (R2 values, M1: 0.718 ± 0.055; M2: 0.835 ± 0.031; M3: 
0.817 ± 0.035; Humans: 0.619 ± 0.037), and the item-limit model (R2 values, M1: 
0.402 ± 0.041; M2: 0.222 ± 0.038; M3: 0.263 ± 0.049; Humans: 0.228 ± 0.048).  
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Figure 9 
 
Figure 3.9. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change magnitude 
(º) for humans. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean 
± s.e.m. across subjects). IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-Precision, EPF: Equal-
Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: Variable-Precision + 
Fixed Capacity.  
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Figure 10 
 
Figure 3.10. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change 
magnitude (º) for M1. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits 
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-
Precision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: 
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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Figure 11 
 
Figure 3.11. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change 
magnitude (º) for M2. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits 
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-
Precision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: 
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
 
 
 
30 60 9030 60 90
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
30 60 9030 60 9030 60 90
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
co
rr
ec
t
Change magnitude (º)
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
co
rr
ec
t
IL EP EPF
VP VPF
M2
R2 = 0.222 ± 0.038 R2 = 0.835 ± 0.031 R2 = 0.854 ± 0.030
R2 = 0.885 ± 0.024 R2 = 0.887 ± 0.024
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
N=2
N=3
N=4
N=5
51 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 3.12. Proportion correct as a function of set size (N) and change 
magnitude (º) for M3. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits 
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets). IL: Item-Limit, EP: Equal-
Precision, EPF: Equal-Precision + Fixed Capacity, VP: Variable-Precision, VPF: 
Variable-Precision + Fixed Capacity.  
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Possibly a more principled way to compare models is the Bayesian model 
comparison, a likelihood-based method that automatically corrects for the 
number of free parameters. It is important to note that the variable precision 
model with the fixed capacity limit is not a substantial improvement over the 
variable precision model without an upper bound, when taking into account that 
the former has an extra parameter (in humans, the latter actually performs 
marginally better). We thus prefer the simpler version of the variable precision 
model.  We found that the log marginal likelihood of the variable-precision model 
exceeded that of the equal-precision + fixed capacity, equal-precision, and item-
limit models for both species (Figures 3.13 - 3.16); this result remains unchanged 
when other model comparison metrics are used (see Table 2.1). These findings 
demonstrate that both monkey and human VWM are not limited by a fixed item 
capacity, but instead gradually deteriorate as more items have to be 
remembered. Despite the quantitative differences in memory performance 
between species, the success of the variable-precision model for both species 
demonstrates qualitative similarity and suggests evolutionary continuity of basic 
VWM mechanisms. 
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Figure 13 
 
Figure 3.13. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equal-
precision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models 
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for humans. A 
value of –x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-
precision model. 
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Figure 14 
 
Figure 3.14. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equal-
precision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models 
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M1. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision 
model. 
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Figure 15 
 
Figure 3.15. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equal-
precision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models 
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M2. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision 
model. 
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Figure 16 
 
Figure 3.16. Marginal log likelihoods of the item limit, equal-precision, equal-
precision with fixed capacity, and variable-precision with fixed capacity models 
minus those of the variable-precision model (mean ± s.e.m.), for M3. A value of –
x means that the data are ex times more probable under the variable-precision 
model. 
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Table 1 
Model  AIC*(model)-
AIC*(VP) 
AICc*(model)-
AICc*(VP) 
BIC*(model)-
BIC*(VP) 
 LML(model)-
LML(VP) 
 
  Mean Mean Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m 
IL M1 -126 -125 -122 15 -121 15 
 M2 -184 -183 -180 18 -180 18 
 M3 -168 -167 -164 18 -163 18 
 Humans -48.2 -47.2 -45.7 6.8 -47.1 6.6 
EP M1 -48.5 -47.5 -44.8 9.2 -48.9 9.1 
 M2 -13.8 -12.8 -10.1 4.6 -12.7 4.8 
 M3 -31.3 -30.3 -27.6 7.8 -31.3 8.1 
 Humans -13.9 -12.9 -11.4 1.5 -14.4 1.7 
EPF M1 -40.2 -40.2 -40.2 7.9 -39.0 7.8 
 M2 -9.3 -9.3 -9.3 4.4 -6.7 4.6 
 M3 -24.0 -24.0 -24.0 6.7 -22.6 6.9 
 Humans -7.6 -7.6 -7.6 1.5 -6.2 1.6 
VPF M1 -0.50 -1.3 -4.18 0.83 1.5 1.5 
 M2 -0.31 -2.2 -4.0 0.91 1.2 0.81 
 M3 0.44 -0.56 -3.2 1.5 2.0 1.1 
 Humans -0.48 -1.46 -3.00 0.32 -0.57 0.31 
 
Table 3.1. Model comparisons of each model (IL: item-limit, EP: equal-precision, 
EPF:  equal-precision + fixed capacity, and VPF: variable-precision + fixed 
capacity) showing mean differences minus that of the variable-precision model. 
The standard error of the mean is the same across AIC, AICc, and BIC because 
these measures have the same leading term, , and only differ in their 
penalty terms. 
 
maxLL
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Given that the fundamental nature of VWM limitations is consistent 
between these two species, the quantitative performance differences may simply 
be due to differences in their parameter values within the same model (Tables 
3.2 and 3.3). Mean precision, , was much lower in monkeys than in humans, 
which might be related to attentional differences between the two species. The 
exponent, α, in the relationship between mean precision and set size was similar 
across monkeys and somewhat higher in humans.  
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                                    Humans 
 
Table 2 
  Tested range  
Model Parameter Min Step Max Mean s.e.m. 
IL  1 1 5 1.50 0.17 
  0 0.003 3 0.079 0.011 
EP  0 0.13 25 17.7 2.3 
  0 0.015 3 2.07 0.12 
EPF  1 1 5 2.20 0.36 
  0 0.13 25 15.3 2.5 
  0 0.015 3 1.43 0.25 
VP  0 1.01 100 65.8 8.7 
  0.1 1.11 100 29.3 8.5 
  0 0.03 3 1.82 0.13 
VPF  0 2.02 200 83.0 17.9 
  0.1 2.13 200 25.3 5.4 
  0 0.061 3 1.97 0.18 
  1 1 5 4.10 0.28 
 
Table 3.2. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates for humans. Means and 
standard errors were computed across subjects. 
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Monkeys 
Table 3 
  Tested range M1 M2 M3 
Model Parameter Min Step Max Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m. 
IL  1 1 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 
  0 0.003 3 0.248 0.0055 0.269 0.0062 0.249 0.0065 
EP  0 0.13 25 3.51 0.78 2.41 0.68 2.71 0.69 
  0 0.015 3 2.35 0.21 1.98 0.27 1.98 0.26 
EPF  1 1 5 1 0 1.16 0.79 1.12 0.62 
  0 0.13 25 1.23 0.085 1.12 0.16 1.35 0.31 
  0 0.015 3 1.35 0.60 1.57 0.74 1.89 0.83 
VP  0 0.30 30 11.0 1.8 3.82 0.87 7.0 1.8 
  0.1 0.40 30 24.9 4.4 6.2 2.6 15.7 5.9 
  0 0.03 3 1.47 0.14 1.32 0.14 1.31 0.13 
VPF  0 0.30 30 10.2 2.7 3.7 1.4 7.7 2.7 
  0.1 0.40 30 23.8 5.1 5.6 2.8 13.9 5.2 
  0 0.03 3 1.55 0.49 1.47 0.48 1.5 0.41 
  1 1 5 3.6 1.8 3.4 1.5 3.2 1.1 
 
Table 3.3. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates for monkeys. Means and 
standard errors were computed across bootstrapped datasets. 
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Our findings provide cross-species evidence that visual information is 
encoded in working memory in a noisy manner, with precision per item varying 
across items and trials, and on average decreasing with increasing set size. This 
is consistent with mounting evidence in humans (Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van 
den Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Variability in precision 
could result from a variety of factors including, eye movements, interference from 
other stimuli, and fluctuations in attention. At the neural level, precision may 
correspond to the gain of a neural population pattern encoding the stimulus (Ma 
et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). Neurophysiological evidence 
supports this notion, showing that firing rate decreases as set size increases 
(Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). A plausible mechanistic implementation of 
the variable-precision model was recently proposed (Bays, 2014). Thus, at 
present, behavioral, physiological, and computational data seem to 
unambiguously point toward resource models as the best account of VWM 
limitations, and our results establish rhesus monkeys as a suitable model system 
for further elucidating the neural substrates of these limitations.  
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CHAPTER 4: CHANGE DETECTION TESTING IN RHESUS MONKEYS AND 
HUMANS: DECISION-MAKING 
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Introduction 
 
One of the key functions of the brain is to process and interpret sensory 
information to make perceptual decisions. Sensory information available to the 
subject is necessarily limited. For example, the sensory measurements might be 
of low quality, due to both internal (noisy encoding) and external (e.g., poor 
contrast, distant or fast-moving objects, etc.) factors. Even when sensory quality 
is high, the same sensory stimulus is subject to multiple interpretations. Given 
this partially informative sensory information, our inference is probabilistic; that is, 
it comes with some degree of uncertainty. The brain must evaluate the uncertain 
sensory information effectively, make judgments relative to goals, and respond to 
the environment accordingly.  
As described in previous chapters, the precision with which sensory 
information is represented internally can vary across items and trials, and in 
many perceptual tasks, the degree of precision not only has a role in  the 
encoding stage, but also plays a role in the observer’s decision-making stage. 
The change detection task taps into both of these stages of VWM processing. 
The observer encodes and maintains information about the sample stimuli, 
compares its memory of the sample stimuli with the test stimuli at the 
corresponding locations, makes a judgment about which test stimulus has 
changed, and then makes a response. In the change-detection task, the 
precision of the task-relevant stimulus can be manipulated by changing the 
reliability of the stimulus; for example, the height to width ratio of an ellipse in an 
orientation change detection task, such that a low reliability ellipse would be 
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shorter and wider, making the orientation change more difficult to discriminate. 
The question, then, is how the observer factors in unreliable stimuli along with 
reliable stimuli in making judgments and decisions about which stimulus changed 
in orientation.  
A Bayesian-optimal observer would learn to use the noisy internal 
representations of the stimuli and essentially compute a probability distribution 
indicating where the change occurred, giving more weight to reliable evidence 
(e.g., longer and thinner ellipses) than to unreliable evidence (e.g., shorter, fatter 
ellipses). Based on the computed relative weight of evidence, the observer 
chooses the location with the higher probability of change. Since the uncertainty 
can change on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, this requires trial-to-trial 
computations of probability distributions over stimulus features. These types of 
computations are referred to as probabilistic computations (see Ma, 2012 for a 
review).  
In a related visual change-detection paradigm, human subjects were 
asked to identify whether or not an orientation change occurred in the test display 
containing four ellipses (Keshvari, Van den Berg, and Ma, 2012). Reliability of the 
stimuli was manipulated (as previously described) and the results were evaluated 
by fitting an optimal-observer model against suboptimal models to assess how 
the observers took into account the reliability of the stimuli and the variability in 
precision. The decision models that were tested differed according to the 
assumption that the observer makes about encoding precision. 
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Performance was best described by an optimal model, in which the 
observer had complete knowledge about precision for every item on every trial. 
In the decision stage, the observer uses this information about encoding 
precision and about the reliability stimulus differences on an item-by-item and 
trial-by-trial basis to make an optimal decision about change. Two suboptimal 
models were also tested in which the observer makes an incorrect assumption 
about precision by either 1) assuming that precision is completely determined by 
the reliability of the stimulus and ignored other sources of variability or 2) 
assuming a single value of precision throughout the experiment, and ignored all 
sources of variability including manipulations of reliability of the stimulus.  
  Although monkeys and humans were shown to have similar VWM 
encoding mechanisms (Chapter 3), it is nevertheless an open question whether 
monkeys would employ similar or different decision processes in this change 
detection task.  To this end, two rhesus monkeys and ten humans were tested to 
determine similarities or differences in decision processes in nearly identical 
change detection tasks.  
Subjects briefly viewed a sample array of three randomly oriented ellipses 
(fixed set size) and, following a delay, a test array containing two randomly 
chosen ellipses from the sample array, of which one had a different orientation 
than in the sample array (Figure 4.1). The reliability of the stimulus was 
manipulated by changing the height-to-width ratio of the ellipse (see Methods). 
Thus, on each trial, each item could either be a high-reliability ellipse (longer, 
thinner) or a low-reliability (shorter, wider) ellipse. Furthermore, in a manner 
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similar to Aim 1, the magnitude of the orientation change could take one of nine 
values and subjects identified which item had changed orientation by touching it, 
and received trial-to-trial feedback. 
Figure 17 
 
Figure 4.1. Task Procedure. Schematic representation showing a sample trial. 
Set size was always 3. Stimulus reliability was controlled by ellipse elongation.  
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The decision models tested by Keshvari et al. (2012) were adapted to fit 
the somewhat different change-detection task used here where subjects were 
presented with only two test stimuli each trial and had to report which changed. 
The three decision models considered here differed only in the decision rule. For 
the encoding stage, precision was modeled based on the variable-precision 
model (Chapter 3) since evidence from the first experiment suggested variable 
precision encoding by both species (Figure 4.2). The decision rules are based on 
the assumption that the observer makes about encoding precision.  
Figure 18 
 
Figure 4.2. Flow diagram of the encoding and decision processes. Models here 
are identical in the encoding stage, but differ in the assumption that the observer 
makes about precision.  
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The theory and derivations of these models are described in the Methods 
section. In the names of the models below, the “variable precision” before the 
hyphen indicates encoding stage and the latter indicates the decision stage, 
which is based on the observer’s assumption about precision.  
1) Variable Precision-Variable Precision (Optimal): Encoding precision is variable 
and the observer has complete knowledge of an item’s precision on each trial. 
The observer, thus, computes precision on a trial-by-trial and item-by-item basis, 
taking into account the reliability of the stimulus and giving more weight to more 
reliable stimuli. 
2) Variable Precision-Equal Precision (Suboptimal): Encoding precision is 
variable; however, the observer assumes that precision is completely determined 
by the reliability of the stimulus, and ignores any other variability in encoding 
precision across items and trials. The observer, thus, assumes only two values of 
precision: high (when the stimulus has high reliability) and low (when the stimulus 
has low reliability).  
3) Variable Precision-Single Precision (Suboptimal): Encoding precision is 
variable; however, the observer assumes that precision stays constant 
throughout the experiment; thus, ignoring both variations due to reliability of the 
stimuli and other variability. The observer, then, applies a single value of 
precision across all items and trials.  
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Methods 
Monkeys 
Subjects 
Two adult male rhesus monkeys, M1 and M2 from Chapter 3 participated 
in this experiment (M3 could not participate because of health issues) five days 
each week. All animal procedures were performed in accordance with the 
National Institutes of Health guidelines, approved by the Institutional Review 
Board at University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, and supervised 
by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.  
Apparatus 
 Monkeys were tested with the same apparatus as the one described in 
Chapter 3.  
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of white ellipses displayed on a black background. Two 
types of ellipses were used: “high-reliability” (long and narrow) and “low-
reliability” (short and wide). In this experiment, ellipses were chosen instead of 
oriented bars (ones used in Chapter 3) because ellipses contain less corner 
information and orientation changes are more difficult to discriminate, particularly 
as the ellipses get shorter and wider. The size of the high-reliability stimuli was 
1.8 x 0.4 cm and that of the low-reliability stimuli was 0.93 x 0.77 cm. The area of 
both types of stimuli remained the same; only the height-to-width ratio was 
changed. Based on the average distance of the monkey from the screen 
70 
 
(approximately 35 cm), the high-reliability and low-reliability stimuli subtended a 
visual angle of 2.9° x 0.65 ° and 1.5° x 1.3° respectively. Stimuli were presented 
in six possible locations on the screen, arranged on an imaginary circle (same as 
Chapter 3).  
Trial procedure 
Each trial began with a red fixation point in the center of the screen as 
shown in Figure 4.1. The monkeys had to make a one-touch response to the 
fixation point, which initiated the presentation of a sample display. In this 
experiment, the set size remained fixed, so the sample display always contained 
three items, and had a presentation time of 300 ms.  After a delay of 1000 ms, 
the test display was presented, which always consisted of two items, placed at 
the same locations as two randomly chosen items from the sample display. One 
test item had the same orientation as the corresponding item in the sample 
display, and the other test item had a different orientation. It is important to note 
that the test items always had the same stimulus type (reliability) as the sample 
items. For example, a high-reliability sample item would always be a high-
reliability if it was chosen as a test item; the only change occurred in the 
orientation of the changed item. The monkeys’ task was to identify which item 
had changed, and to touch that item. The test display remained on the screen 
until response. Correct responses were rewarded. An intertrial interval of 3000 
ms followed the choice response, during which a green light illuminated the 
chamber and the screen was dark. There were four trial conditions: 1) Both test 
items were of high reliability; therefore the changed item was of high reliability 2) 
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The changed item was of high reliability and the unchanged item was of low 
reliability 3) The changed item was low-reliability and the unchanged item was 
high-reliability 4) Both test items were low-reliability, so the changed item was 
low-reliability.  
Training  
Both monkeys that participated in this study (M1 and M2) had been 
previously trained in a change detection task using oriented bars. For preliminary 
training of these two monkeys, we intermixed trials of oriented bars (old stimuli) 
with trials of oriented ellipses for initial task acquisition, which required 6 sessions 
per monkey. Once the monkeys’ performance on ellipse trials was similar to 
baseline performance with oriented bars, we began training them with only 
ellipses trials. Both monkeys were first trained with only high-reliability ellipses at 
a set size of 2 and a sample viewing time of 300 ms. Once overall accuracy 
reached approximately 70%, the monkeys were tested with a set size of 3. 
Finally, we gradually intermixed the low-reliability trials with set size 3 and once 
the monkeys’ performance on these trials reached 60%, they were ready for 
testing. For M1 and M2, this training required 28 and 32 sessions respectively.  
Testing 
Set size was fixed at 3. On every trial, each item had an equal probability 
of being a high- or low-reliability ellipse. The locations of the ellipses were 
chosen randomly from 6 possibilities. The orientation of each sample item, θ, 
was drawn independently from a uniform distribution over 18 possible 
72 
 
orientations (−90°, −80°,…, −10°, 10°, 20°,…, 80°). The orientation of the 
changed item in the test display was drawn from the same uniform distribution. 
Testing consisted of 60 sessions, with 192-trial blocks per session, for a total of 
11,520 trials per monkey.  
Humans 
Subjects 
Ten human subjects (8 females) aged 21-33 years (mean age = 27.1 
years) participated. Each subject visited the lab for two 1.5-hour sessions and 
was compensated $10 per session. Study procedures were approved by the 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston Institutional Review 
Board.   
Apparatus and Stimuli  
The apparatus for this experiment remained the same as the one used to 
test subjects in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3). Subjects were seated in a chair in a 
small room equipped with a computer. At the beginning of the experiment, the 
distance between the chair and the screen was adjusted so that the stimuli and 
display would subtend approximately the same visual angles as for the monkeys. 
Subjects were asked to maintain approximately the same distance. The monitor 
and touchscreen were identical to those used for monkeys.  
Trial Procedure 
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The trial procedure was identical to that for the monkeys, except for the 
feedback. Feedback consisted of a green light that was illuminated for 1 s and 
accompanied by a tone for correct responses, or a red light illuminated for 1 s for 
incorrect responses (same feedback as the one in Chapter 3 experiment).  
Training and Testing 
Each subject completed two testing sessions, each consisting of three 
192-trial blocks, for a total of 1152 trials per subject. Subjects were given a 10-
minute break time in between blocks. Each subject completed 8 practice trials at 
the beginning of the first session (same from Chapter 3 experiment).  
 
Theory and Modeling 
 
Three models of decision-making were considered in this change-
detection task. On a given trial, the observer’s decision process consists of an 
encoding stage and a decision stage. Here, the encoding stage in all three 
models remained identical and was modeled according to the variable precision 
model from Aim 1 (see below).  
Encoding stage: Variable Precision 
 For this task, we model encoding precision as a random variable. The 
theory and derivations of this encoding stage remain largely the same as one 
described in Chapter 2. First, as in Experiment 1, the orientation space was 
mapped to the interval [0,2π) by multiplying all orientations and orientation 
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change magnitudes by 2 before analysis for simplification. This method was 
expressed in all equations shown below; however, for the figures, the change 
magnitudes were mapped back to actual orientation space. Second, it was 
assumed that both orientations in the test display, denoted by φ1 and φ2, are 
known noiselessly to the observer, because they remain on the screen until the 
observer responds. Third, the relationship between encoding precision 
(expressed as Fisher information denoted J) and the concentration parameter 
(denoted ) remains the same as in Chapter 2:  
 ,                                   (6) 
where I1 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 1. 
 As previously described for the variable precision model, encoding 
precision is a random variable that follows, independently for each item and each 
trial, a gamma distribution with mean and scale parameter , denoted
with mean and variance .  
A key difference in this experiment is that mean differs between the 
stimulus type: encoding precision is drawn from two distributions depending upon 
stimulus type: For a high-reliability item, mean precision is . For a low-
reliability item, mean precision is . The noisy measurements x1 and x2 are 
drawn from a doubly stochastic process, where first, precisions J1 and J2 are 
each drawn from a gamma distribution with mean  or  and scale 
κ
( )
( )
1
0
I
J
I
κ
κ
κ
=
J τ ( | ; )p J J τ
J Jτ
J
highJ
lowJ
highJ lowJ
75 
 
parameterτ; then, the noisy measurements are drawn from the Von Mises 
distribution (Eqn 2) with concentration parameters κ1 and κ2, which are 
determined by J1 and J2 respectively (Eqn 1).  
  (2) 
where I0 is the modified Bessel functions of the first kind of order 0 and the noisy 
memory of the ith item in the sample display, denoted xi.  
Generative model and Inference 
 The generative model and inference in this experiment remains the same 
as described in Chapter 2. The resulting decision rule is identical to the one used 
to model the decision process in Experiment 1. For derivations of the log 
posterior ratio, refer to Chapter 2.  
The ideal observer responds that the change occurred at location 1 when 
the log posterior ratio is positive: 
 
This decision rule is valid for all decision models considered here. They simply 
differ in how the concentration parameters, and weigh the reliability of the 
stimulus. These differences are described below.  
Model Differences in Decision Rules 
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In the Variable Precision-Variable Precision (optimal) model, the observer 
has complete knowledge of precision on every item and trial so uses the actual 
values of κ1 and κ2. The decision rule is then to localize the change at location 1 
if 
 
In the Variable Precision-Equal Precision (suboptimal) model, the 
observer assumes equal precision for every item, on every trial. The assumed 
value is  for a high-reliability item, and  for a low-reliability item. These 
correspond to concentration parameters κhigh and κlow. The decision rule, then, is 
the same as above but with κ1 and κ2 each taking on one of only two possible 
values, κhigh and κlow, depending on the reliability of that item.  
In the Variable Precision-Single Precision (suboptimal) model, the 
observer completely disregards the reliability of the stimulus and pretends κ1=κ2, 
so they do not use a weighted precision value. Then, the decision rule simplifies 
to: 
 
Lapse rate: For each of these models, we fitted a lapse rate parameter 
which accounts for errors due to lapses in attention, blinking or eye movements 
during stimulus presentation, or errors in making a response.  
( )
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Each of these models have 4 parameters: , , , and lapse.  
Model predictions 
The probability of correct predicted by each model was computed for each 
stimulus condition, given the model parameters. Based on the assumptions in the 
generative model, in this task, the stimulus condition is determined by change 
magnitude Δ, and four condition types, C, described above: 1) Both high-
reliability 2) Mix stimuli; high-reliability change 3) Mix stimuli; low-reliability 
change and 4) Both low-reliability. Thus, the probability that the decision rules for 
each of the models returns the correct location is computed when the memories 
x1 and x2 follow their respective distributions given C and Δ.  
Each of these proportions correct was determined through Monte Carlo 
simulation, i.e. through a large number (10,000) of random draws of x1 and x2 
and of J1 and J2. For each draw, the decision rule was evaluated, and then 
computed across all draws of the proportion of correct responses.  
Finally, for each model, the parameter space was discretized finely (see 
Table 1) and a look-up table was calculated in which each entry gave the 
predicted probability of a correct response at one trial combination (C, Δ) for one 
parameter combination. 
Model fitting 
For a given model, the model parameters are denoted by a vector t. The 
log likelihood of t (the parameter log likelihood) is 
highJ lowJ τ
78 
 
  
where the product is over trials (from 1 to ntrials) and correctnessi is 1 if the 
subject was correct on the ith trial and 0 if not. We can rewrite this as 
, (4) 
where trials are grouped by trial condition, C, change magnitude Δ, and by 
whether the observer was correct or incorrect, and n (C,Δ,correct) is the number 
of trials with a particular C, Δ, and correctness. 
The same method of maximum likelihood estimation (as one described in 
Chapter 3) was used to compute parameter estimates. Thus, for each subject’s 
data set Eq. (4) and the precomputed look-up table of model predictions 
mentioned above was used to find the log likelihood of each parameter 
combination. The parameter combination on this grid that maximized the log 
likelihood gives the estimates of the parameters. The model predictions 
corresponding to that parameter combination were then used to compute the 
model fits to the psychometric curves. 
Model comparison 
To compare models, the same four metrics from Chapter 3 were used: the 
Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974), the Akaike Information Corrected 
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Criterion (Burnham, 2002; Hurvich & Tsai, 1989), the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (Schwarz, 1978), and the log marginal likelihood (MacKay, 2003).  
Bootstrapping 
The original data set for each of the two monkeys consisted of 11,520 
trials. The same bootstrapping method (described in Chapter 2) was used to 
create 100 bootstrapped data sets for each monkey. A random sample 11,520 
trials (a combination of condition, change magnitude, and correctness) was 
selected with replacement from the original dataset to create each bootstrapped 
data set. The parameter estimates, psychometric curves, R2 values, and model 
comparisons (AIC, AICc, BIC, and LML) were generated for each bootstrapped 
data set separately. The means for each of these were computed by averaging 
across all bootstrapped data sets from the same monkey, and the standard 
deviations served as estimates of the standard errors of the means.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 Humans and monkeys both showed the highest proportion correct at 
condition 1, where both stimuli were high-reliability ellipses and the lowest 
proportion correct at condition 4, where both stimuli were low-reliability ellipses 
(Figure 4.3). Proportion correct was intermediate in the mix conditions (where 
one test item was high- and one was low-reliability) compared with conditions 
1and 4. Interestingly, in the mix conditions, when the changed item was of high-
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reliability, accuracy was higher than when the changed item was of low-reliability 
reflecting their training to look for and chose the stimulus that changed.  
Figure 19 
 
Figure 4.3. Proportion correct across four trial conditions for humans and two 
monkeys.  
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A more detailed representation of the data is provided by proportion 
correct as a function of change magnitude for each of the four conditions (Figure 
4.4). We found large effects of both condition (high vs. low reliability) and change 
magnitude on performance for both species (humans: two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA; condition: F(3,27) = 231.35, p < 0.001, change magnitude: 
F(8,72) = 64.91, p <  0.001; interaction: F(24,216) = 15.73, p < 0.001). 
Interestingly, the effect of change magnitude dissipates in both species in 
conditions 3 and 4, when the changed item is a low-reliability stimulus. This 
finding of change-magnitude dissipation in condition 3 suggests that both species 
took into account the uncertainty of the low-reliable stimulus and gave more 
weight to the high-reliable stimulus. And to the extent that the subjects could 
judge that the high-reliability item did not change, they were able to infer that the 
changed item then must be the low-reliability item. Thus, the change magnitude 
of the low-reliability item was less important since the decision could be based on 
a ‘default’ response when the subject was confident that the high-reliability item 
did not change. Overall, humans performed better than monkeys at all 
conditions; however, both species showed strikingly similar qualitative patterns of 
performance in all conditions.   
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Figure 20 
 
Figure 4.4. (A) Proportion correct as a function change magnitude across four 
trial conditions for humans (mean ± s.e.m. across ten subjects) (B) Same for M1 
(mean ± s.e.m. across bootstrapped datasets) (C) Same for M2 (mean ± s.e.m. 
across bootstrapped datasets) 
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In spite of the large quantitative differences between the performances of 
both species, it is possible that the underlying mechanisms of perceptual 
decision-making are similar. To test this possibility, three decision models were 
compared for each individual monkey and human. The parameter estimates in 
each model were derived by using maximum-likelihood estimation and were fitted 
for each human subject as well as for each data set sampled using bootstrapping 
from an individual monkey’s data.  
Performance of both species was best described by the variable precision-
equal precision suboptimal model (Humans: R2 = 0.875 ± 0.018, M1: R2 = 0.845 
± 0.025, M2: R2 = 0.901 ± 0.021), followed by the variable precision-variable 
precision optimal model (Humans: R2 = 0.814 ± 0.025, M1: R2 = 0.782 ± 0.031, 
M2: R2 = 0.641 ± 0.033), and the variable precision-single precision suboptimal 
model (Humans: R2 = 0.431 ± 0.039, M1: R2 = 0.507 ± 0.047, M2: R2 = 0.391 ± 
0.038; Figures 4.5 - 4.7). These conclusions were similar when likelihood-based 
model comparison metrics were used (Table 4.1).  
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Figure 21 
 
Figure 4.5. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º) 
for humans. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ± 
s.e.m. across subjects). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VP-EP: 
Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable 
Precision.  
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Figure 22 
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º) 
for M1. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ± s.e.m. 
across bootstrapped datasets). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VP-
EP: Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable 
Precision.  
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Figure 23 
 
Figure 4.7. Proportion correct across trial conditions and change magnitudes (º) 
for M2. Circles and error bars: behavior; shaded areas: model fits (mean ± s.e.m. 
across bootstrapped datasets). VP-SP: Variable Precision-Single Precision, VP-
EP: Variable Precision-Equal Precision, and VP-VP: Variable Precision-Variable 
Precision.  
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Table 4 
Model  AIC*/AICc*/BIC*(model)-
AIC*/AICc*/BIC* (VP-EP) 
LML(model)-
LML(VP-EP) 
  Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m 
VP-SP M1 -107 14 -107 14 
 M2 -199 23 -204 24 
 Humans -57.5 5.9 -39 4.5 
VP-VP M1 -16 11 -19 11 
 M2 -102 17 -107 17 
 Humans -12.1 2.4 -2.4 1.4 
 
Table 4.1. Model comparisons of two models (VP-VP: variable precision-variable 
precision and VP-SP: variable precision-variable precision) showing mean 
differences minus that of the winning model, variable precision-equal precision 
model. The VP-EP model outperforms the other models according to all metrics. 
The means and standard error of the means are the same across AIC, AICc, and 
BIC because these measures have the same leading term, , and an equal 
number of parameters. 
 
 
 
 
maxLL
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These findings demonstrate that monkeys and humans are Bayesian-
observers that take into account the uncertainty of sensory observations when 
making perceptual judgments, giving more weight to more certain evidence (see 
parameter estimates in Table 4.2). Even though encoding precision varies on an 
item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, in this task, humans and monkeys make a 
wrong assumption about precision, and assume two values of precision that are 
completely determined by the reliability of the stimulus. They ignore other 
variability in encoding precision that may arise due to noise from both external 
and internal factors to the brain. 
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Table 5 
     Monkeys Humans 
  Tested Range M1 M2  
Model Parameter Min Step Max Mean ± s.e.m. Mean ± s.e.m. Mean ± s.e.m. 
VP-VP highJ  0 1.01 100 7.0 ± 1.9 6.8 ± 1.2 30.3 ± 3.6 
 lowJ  0 1.01 100 1.08 ± 0.26 1.07 ± 0.24 1.72 ± 0.34 
 τ 0.1 1.1 100 61 ± 18 63 ± 17 45 ± 11 
 lapse 0 0.002 0.2 0.041 ± 0.038 0.044 ± 0.034 0.046 ± 0.018 
VP-EP highJ  0 1.01 100 6.34 ± 0.92 9.2 ± 1.9 38.4 ± 4.4 
 lowJ  0 1.01 100 1.09 ± 0.28 1.46 ± 0.54 2.32 ± 0.45 
 τ 0.1 1.1 100 22.7 ± 4.7 41 ± 10 42.9 ± 7.8 
 lapse 0 0.002 0.2 0.210 ± 0.002 0.19 ± 0.026 0.031 ± 0.013 
VP-SP highJ  0 1.01 100 9.8 ± 3.7 7.85 ± 0.94 29.0  ± 3.1 
 lowJ  0 1.01 100 4.1 ± 1.8 4.0 ± 0.47 5.35 ± 0.77 
 τ 0.1 1.1 100 52  ± 25 70 ± 12 22.4 ± 5.4 
 lapse 0 0.002 0.2 0.17 ± 0.061 0.011 ± 0.031 0.088 ± 0.018 
 
Table 4.2. Parameter ranges and parameter estimates. For monkeys, means and 
standard errors were computed across 100 bootstrapped data sets. For humans, 
means and standard errors were computed across subjects. 
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These findings differ from those in a related change-detection task 
(Keshvari et al., 2012). Notably, the change-detection task used in the two 
studies differed in some important ways that changes the complexity of the task. 
First, the sample display in this study contained three items as opposed to four 
items in the Keshvari et al. (2012) study. Second, in the Keshvari study, subjects 
were asked to report whether or not a change occurred in two consecutive 
displays that were identical, except for one changed item in 50% of the trials. In 
the current study, there was always a change in the orientation of one of the 
items between displays and the task was to identify where the change occurred. 
Subjects in this study had a 50% chance of responding correctly, since only two 
items were shown during test. Third, in the Keshvari study, both the sample and 
test stimuli were presented for 100 ms each, whereas in this study, sample 
viewing time was 300 ms and the test stimuli remained on the screen until 
response. The latter two differences change the dependence of the task 
parameters and thus the generative model, which changes the inference and 
decision rules in many ways. Lastly, in the Keshvari (2012) task, subjects did not 
receive trial-to-trial feedback, whereas in this study, both humans (green light + 
tone) and monkeys (food reward) received trial-to-trial feedback. It has been 
suggested that when subjects receive trial-to-trial feedback to their responses, 
both humans and nonhuman animals could learn the values of the task variables, 
and use them strategically rather than relying on the internal estimates of 
uncertainty in the sensory measurements of those variables (Ma, 2012). For 
example, in our task, after receiving feedback, subjects (both humans and 
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monkeys) may have learned that they could maximize their performance by 
strategically allocating attention only to the high-reliability stimuli. It remains to be 
understood which of these differences could have contributed to the differences 
in the findings.   
Change detection has primarily been used to understand the encoding 
limitations of VWM processing. This is the first account of testing monkeys in a 
change-detection task to understand whether monkeys use Bayesian-inference 
in perceptual decision-making. Our findings provide cross-species evidence that 
while humans and monkeys may be Bayesian observers, they may not always 
use probabilistic computations for optimal decision-making. In this regard, 
primates in general might be suboptimal, depending on the complexity of the 
task. It remains to be understood at which point optimality breaks down, even 
though probabilistic computations continue to be performed at the neural level.  
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
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General Conclusions 
The experiments presented in this thesis combined tools of 
psychophysics, learning, memory and computational modeling to compare for the 
first time encoding and decision processes of rhesus monkeys to those of 
humans in nearly identical visual working memory (VWM) tasks. In Aim 1 
(Chapter 2), predictions of five leading models of VWM encoding limitations were 
tested in monkeys and humans using a change-detection task, where set size 
and change magnitude were systematically manipulated.  In Aim 2 (Chapter 3), 
the change-detection task from Chapter 2 was modified to investigate whether 
monkeys and humans integrate uncertain sensory information from multiple 
items and whether they do so in an optimal fashion. Although change detection 
has been studied extensively in humans, several of these models had not been 
applied to the specific parameters of this task, and no previous study had 
compared all of these models in parallel with monkeys and humans.   
 I have shown here that in both species, resource models in general, 
provided a much better fit to the data than the classic item-limit (“slot”) model. 
Resource models account for noisy encoding of stimuli, as opposed to an “all-or-
none” storage. In accord with this theory, the errors in performance are then due 
to a problem in separating the signal from noise, rather than due to a fixed limit in 
the number of items that can be remembered. This notion fits well within the 
framework of signal detection theory and has been shown in many Bayesian 
models of perception, including change detection and its close variants (Elmore 
et al., 2011; Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; Lara & Wallis, 2012; van den Berg, Shin, 
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et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004). A question that we do not formally address here 
is the source(s) of noise. Errors in recollecting stimuli from memory could be due 
to several factors that arise at different stages of memory processing; for 
example, noise during initial encoding of stimulus when sensory information is 
processed (particularly due to short viewing times), inability to maintain these 
memory representations when they are no longer accessible for view (delay 
period), difficulty retrieving memory of a sample stimulus, or deciding which 
response to make.  We do not formally distinguish among these possibilities 
here; however, future studies might consider investigating these sources of 
noise, whether they can be manipulated or minimized, and how the nature of 
memory will be affected.  
Specific to the class of resource models, results from both species support 
the notion of variability in memory precision, which allows for flexible allocation of 
precision for the encoding of most (if not all) items in the visual scene, as 
opposed to being equally distributed and/or with a fixed cap (Palmer, 1990; 
Zhang & Luck, 2008).  We found that precision per item varies across stimuli and 
trials, and on average decreases with increasing set size. These findings are 
consistent with mounting evidence in humans across multiple tasks – change 
detection, change localization (color and orientation change), and delayed-
estimation (color and orientation) -- providing further support for the variable 
precision point of view (Fougnie et al., 2012; Keshvari et al., 2012, 2013; van den 
Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et al., 2012). While the origins of the 
variability in precision are not completely understood, several factors could be at 
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play; for example, eye movements, fluctuations in attention over items and trials, 
differences in precision due to stimulus effects such as cardinal orientations and 
configural grouping, and variability in memory decay rates across stimuli (Brady 
& Tenenbaum, 2013; Fougnie et al., 2012; Girshick, Landy, & Simoncelli, 2011; 
Lara & Wallis, 2012; Nienborg & Cumming, 2009).  
We considered two variants of the variable-precision model in Aim 1. One 
version was a variable-precision model with no fixed item limit, and the other was 
a hybrid model with an item limit. It is important to address the key parameters of 
these winning models. The parameter  that characterizes mean precision when 
set size is 1, differed greatly within individual subjects and between species. 
Differences in the values of mean precision could be attributed to several factors, 
including the stimulus-related effects, level of motivation, fatigue, or distraction. A 
second parameter, , captures the effect of set size on mean precision, and  
describes the power with which precision per item decreases as set size 
increases. If set size had no effect on memory precision, then the value of  
would be 0 (indeed, when set size was fixed in Aim 2 and thus had no effect on 
precision, we eliminated this parameter). We found that in both species and in 
both variants of the variable precision model, the  values were more negative 
than -1, indicating steep decreases in mean precision as set size increases.   
In the variable-precision model with the fixed item limit, we found that K 
(typically taken to be the item limit number) was equal to about 3.5 in monkeys 
and 4.1 in humans. In initial reading, these values of K might be reminiscent of 
1J
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α
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the famous magical number 4 ± 1 items. However, it is important to realize that 
there is nothing magical about the values of this parameter. These values seem 
to vary largely across memory tasks, set sizes, as well as stimulus complexity, 
and are greatly dependent on which model is being considered; in fact, across 
monkeys and humans these values have been shown to vary anywhere from 
less than 1 to more than 6 items (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Buschman et al., 
2011; Elmore et al., 2011; Eng et al., 2005; Heyselaar et al., 2011; Keshvari et 
al., 2013; Lara & Wallis, 2012; van den Berg et al., 2014; van den Berg, Shin, et 
al., 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2008). It is being suggested that if one were to adhere 
to the idea of a magical number for capacity, then the power value of is a 
better replacement for K, as it provides a better characterization of the interplay 
between precision and set size to describe VWM limitations (Ma, 2014; under 
review). We do not interpret the value of K as the maximum limit on how many 
items can be remembered. Instead, we believe that it represents the number of 
items that an observer might process on a given trial (which could be a subset of 
total items presented), depending on their level of motivation, attention, or any 
strategic employments. Of course, memory resource (and precision) is limited, 
and as the amount of information presented increases, this resource may not in 
practice be infinitely divisible. In such cases, it is possible that observers flexibly 
allocate memory resource to a subset of visual stimuli (which could be an item or 
a combination of stimulus features as when viewing natural scenes).  
In Aim 2, we found that monkeys and humans are Bayesian-observers 
and take into account the uncertainty of sensory observations when making 
α
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perceptual judgments, giving more weight to more certain evidence. However, 
while memory precision varies on an item-by-item and trial-by-trial basis, in this 
task, humans and monkeys seemed to make an incorrect assumption about 
precision, and assume two values of precision that are completely determined by 
the reliability of the stimulus. They ignore any additional variability in precision 
that may arise due to noise from both external and internal factors to the brain. 
This begs the question, how can observers make a wrong (or right) assumption 
about precision? In probabilistic models, it is suggested that neural populations 
encode with probability distributions over stimulus values on a trial-by-trial and 
item-by-item basis (rather than using point estimates). This “implicit” knowledge 
of the internal representations of stimuli can then be used in downstream 
computation for perceptual judgment and decision-making in optimal or 
suboptimal ways. Since these computations have been shown to differ based on 
the complexity of the tasks in both humans and monkeys, it is important to 
investigate which factors determine whether optimal or suboptimal decision rules 
are used (Gu, Angelaki, & DeAngelis, 2008; Keshvari et al., 2012; Ma & Jazayeri, 
2014; van den Berg, Vogel, Josic, & Ma, 2012; Yang & Shadlen, 2007).  
We think that the most remarkable findings in these series of experiments 
are the qualitative similarities that these two primate species share in both 
encoding and decision-making. In both aims, we found that despite the 
quantitative performance differences between the two species, the same winning 
models account for the species’ behavior. The qualitative similarities between the 
two species shown here may have been expected because rhesus monkeys 
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have been shown to share many aspects of memory processes with humans.  
For example, monkeys show the same primary and recency effects in serial 
position functions and show striking similarities with humans providing evidence 
for a continuous-resource model (Elmore et al., 2011; Roberts & Kraemer, 1981; 
Sands & Wright, 1980; Wright, Santiago, Sands, Kendrick, & Cook, 1985).  
Nevertheless, it is one thing to expect similarities from our experiments, but it is 
another thing altogether to show them and show just how extensive they are.   
These earlier findings along with ours are suggestive of evolutionary 
continuity and common underlying mechanisms of VWM processes in primates 
generally. Indeed, rhesus monkeys and humans have similar neural architecture, 
especially the visual cortex and areas of the prefrontal cortex that are relevant to 
VWM processing (Funahashi et al., 1989; Orban, Van Essen, & Vanduffel, 2004; 
Petrides, 1996). Our results, thus, establish rhesus monkeys as a suitable model 
system for further elucidating the neural substrates of VWM limitations in 
encoding and decision-making. The combination of psychophysics, 
computational modeling, and neurophysiological methods offers great potential to 
unravel how VWM works and why it fails.  
 
Future directions 
It is encouraged that future studies using change detection not only 
consider the typical manipulation of set size, but also vary change magnitude. As 
demonstrated here, the addition of the change-magnitude manipulation unveils 
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profound differences in model predictions. In the same vein, future studies aimed 
at understanding the mechanisms of VWM should provide direct comparisons 
across many if not all leading models (than considering just one or two), because 
only then can goodness-of-fit be properly compared across models and 
arguments of specific processing. Indeed, a recent study that conducted a 
factorial comparison of 32 models that reanalyzed data from several studies of 
VWM limitations found that the conclusions of these data could greatly differ from 
previously-made claims, when such an approach is used (van den Berg et al., 
2014). 
The studies described here (and a growing body of research in humans) 
have pointed to the variability in precision as the key factor in characterizing 
VWM limitations, although the neural basis of variability in precision is only 
beginning to be explored (Emrich, Riggall, Larocque, & Postle, 2013; Ester, 
Anderson, Serences, & Awh, 2013). In general, the neural substrates of VWM 
limitations have previously been based on the framework of fixed-capacity 
models. But now with a growing body of evidence in humans for the variable-
precision model, coupled with identical findings in monkeys from this study, there 
is convergent evidence for the fundamental underlying processes of VWM that 
will serve as a standard for guiding and interpreting neurobiological investigations 
of the complex maze of neural circuits responsible for memory.   
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